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ABSTRACT 
 
The article does three things.  First, and for the first time, it brings to bear the 
perspectives of critical race theory, postcolonial theory, and narrative theory on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Rice v. Cayetano, which dealt a severe blow to Native 
Hawaiians’ struggles for redress and reparations for a century of dispossession and 
impoverishment at the hands of the United States.  Second, it demonstrates in the 
concrete case of Hawaii the power of a particular historical narrative—when it is 
accepted uncritically by the Supreme Court—to render the law itself into an instrument of 
colonial domination.  Third, it links important postcolonial writers—Edward Said, Albert 
Memmi, and Ngugi wa Thiong’o—to contemporary discourse in critical race theory and 
the narrative aspects of law. 
 
The history of the Hawaiian Islands is a far cry from the idyllic, palm fringed beaches of 
the travel posters.  It is a story of domination and dispossession of an indigenous society.  
The article shows how Western historians have tried to erase this story, and put in its 
place a story of the civilizing influences of Western missionaries and traders, who 
brought modern technology and democratic government to a primitive people.  This story 
played a pivotal role in the Rice opinion, enabling the Supreme Court to ignore and evade 
the U.S. government’s own apology to the Native Hawaiians for the loss of their 
sovereignty as a result of colonialist policies of the United States.  The article further 
demonstrates how the Court, in addition to suppressing the historical record, adhered 
woodenly to the fiction of the colorblindness of American law to find that the 
requirement of Native Hawaiian ancestry to vote for the trustees of the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs violated the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
 
The article concludes with three strategies of resistance to law as an instrument of 
colonial power that apply in the Hawaiian case.  These are:  to reclaim the native voice in 
the law at both the trial and appellate level; to deepen and extend criticism of “the law is 
colorblind”; and to pursue Native Hawaiian self-determination through mechanisms of 
international law.   
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The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course; but when 
it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and 
work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now 
plans its future—these issues were reflected, contested, and even 
for a time decided in narrative. …The power to narrate, or to 
block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very 
important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the 
main connections between them. 
 
Edward W. Said1
The conquest of the earth is not a pretty thing when you look 
into it too much. 
 
Robert A. Williams, Jr. (after Joseph Conrad)2
Stories shape history; compare two narratives of contemporary Hawaii.  The first 
celebrates Hawaii as a land of multiracial harmony, as depicted by a white resident of 
Hawaii—a retired high school mathematics teacher and former university professor from 
Massachusetts—in his testimony in 2000 before the Hawaii Advisory Committee of the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights:  
[O]ver the last 20 years or so, there has been a powerful resurgence 
of Hawaiian culture and that has taken place under the auspices of 
the existing governmental system where all people have equal 
rights under the law.  …There are many, many different cultures in 
Hawaii.  All of us are in the minority here.  The various cultures of 
immigrants have done quite well in maintaining and preserving 
their culture, and the Hawaiian renaissance of the last 20 years has 
been extraordinarily powerful.3
1 EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, at xii-xiii (1994). 
2 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 325 (1990). 
 
3 HAWAII ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RECONCILIATION AT A 
CROSSROADS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE APOLOGY RESOLUTION AND RICE V. CAYETANO FOR FEDERAL AND 
STATE PROGRAMS BENEFITING NATIVE HAWAIIANS 8 (2001) (hereinafter, Hawaii Advisory Committee). 
 
2The second offers a Native Hawaiian’s view of the “renaissance” of her people: 
In our subjugation to American control, we have suffered what other 
displaced, dislocated people, such as the Palestinians and the Irish of 
Northern Ireland, have suffered: We have been occupied by a colonial 
power whose every law, policy, cultural institution, and collective 
behavior entrench foreign ways of life in our land and on our people.  
From the banning of our language and the theft of our sovereignty to 
forcible territorial incorporation in 1959 as a state of the United States, 
we have lived as a subordinated Native people in our ancestral home.4
The breathtaking contrast between these narratives illustrates a present-day 
contest in the Hawaiian Islands that is not simply over the accurate portrayal of the 
islands’ recent past, but over land, power, and the survival of an indigenous culture.  
Today’s Native Hawaiians are descendants of the people who occupied the Hawaiian 
Islands from c. 500 A.D.  They developed a flourishing, self-governing culture and 
society prior to the main European contacts that began in 1778.  This culture came under 
the total domination of Western economic and political interests after 1778, culminating 
in the overthrow of the independent Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893 by American business 
interests acting with the support of United States troops.  The United States annexed 
Hawaii as a Territory of the United States in 1898, and admitted it as the fiftieth State in 
1959. 
This paper will show how the relationship between narrative and power has 
undermined present-day Native Hawaiians’ efforts to win legal recognition of their 
political and economic rights as reparation for the American takeover.  What Edward 
Said terms the “power to narrate” has operated at two levels in Hawaii.  At one level, 
Native Hawaiians’ self-definition and cultural identity have suffered displacement in a 
historical record that privileges English-language sources, Western canons of historical 
 
4 Haunani-Kay Trask, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAII 18 (1999). 
 
3evidence, and the rhetoric of “white man’s burden” and “manifest destiny.”  This is the 
level that critical race theorist Richard Delgado calls the “narrative of the ingroup,” 
which consists of the stories told by a dominant group to “remind it of its identity in 
relation to outgroups, and provide it with a form of shared reality in which its own 
superior position is seen as natural.”5 At a second level, that of constitutional 
jurisdprudence, the narrative of color-blindness in American law threatens to foreclose 
Native Hawaiians’ preferential access to economic resources and self-determination, 
despite the Hawaiians’ dispossession during decades of Western control.   
The power to narrate operates at both levels in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2000 
decision in Rice v. Cayetano,6 where the Court invalidated the election of trustees of 
Hawaii’s Office of Hawaiian Affairs, holding that by limiting the electorate to persons of 
Native Hawaiian descent, the State of Hawaii had violated the 15th Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.  The Rice decision accelerated Constitutional challenges to a number 
of Native Hawaiian programs.7 Close analysis of the Court’s decision will reveal how it 
 
5 Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2411, 2412 (1989). 
 
6 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 
7 The decision also gave renewed life to Congressional efforts to formalize the United States’ recognition 
of a “special relationship” with the Native Hawaiians analogous to that between the government and Native 
American Indian tribes.  The most recent vehicle for this effort is Senate Bill 147, “The Native Hawaiian 
Government Reorganization Act of 2005,” also known as “the Akaka Bill” for its principal Senate sponsor, 
Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii).  The bill, which at this writing is awaiting debate and a vote in the Senate, 
would establish a process through which the U.S. government would eventually recognize a Native 
Hawaiian governing entity and enter into negotiations with that entity for purposes of transferring lands and 
resources and governmental authority over them, and setting up a division of civil and criminal authority in 
the Hawaiian Islands.  The Akaka Bill has provoked fervent debate both in Congress and in Hawaii.  
Proponents see it as long overdue recognition of Hawaiian sovereignty and concrete reparation for the U.S. 
government’s role in the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii.  Opponents fall into two camps.  One 
argues that the future status of the Native Hawaiian Governing Entity will still be too bound up with the 
United States Government, and does not go far enough in restoring independence.  The opposite camp 
decries the Akaka Bill as a dangerous racial balkanization of the Hawaiian Islands that will lead to the 
dispossession of all racial and ethnic groups who cannot claim native ancestry.  For a summary of the 
4puts the Native Hawaiians in a double bind.  On the one hand, the opinion relies upon, 
and thus institutionalizes, a racialized history of Hawaii that Western colonizers used to 
legitimate their takeover.  On the other hand, when Native Hawaiians resist, and demand 
reparations and self-determination, they are accused of claiming race-based preferences 
that are impermissible in “color-blind” America.  Rice thus lays bare how law and its 
narratives can function as instruments of colonial domination.8
This article begins with a summary of Hawaiian history that will endeavor to 
respect Native Hawaiian sources, traditions, and perspectives, and that is positioned, in 
the sense that it consciously takes the political position of the indigenous peoples, and 
attempts to recover a history that Westerners have tried to erase.  Part II will introduce 
theoretical perspectives on narrative.  Postcolonial theory will establish the basic 
connections between narrative and power.  Theories of narrative in the law will suggest 
that the forms of legal discourse that predominate in the American legal system silence 
the native voice and enshrine white privilege and power.  Part III will compare the 
narrative of Hawaiian history in Part I to the racialized history the Supreme Court 
 
various positions, see, e.g., the Report of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Rep. 109-68 (2005) 
(hereinafter the McCain Senate Report); Kenneth R. Conklin, Why People Outside Hawaii Should Oppose 
the Akaka Bill, available at http://www.angelfire.com/hi2/hawaiiansovereignty/AkakaOtherStatesOppose. 
html (last visited July 20, 2005);  Brian Duus, Reconciliation Between the United States and Native 
Hawaiians: The Duty of the United States to Recognize a Native Hawaiian Nation and Settle the Ceded 
Lands Dispute, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 13 (2003); Annmarie M. Liermann, Seeking Sovereignty: The 
Akaka Bill and the Case for the Inclusion of Hawaiians in Federal Native American Policy, 41 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 509 (2001); J. KNhaulani Kauanui, Precarious Positions: Native Hawaiians and U.S. 
Federal Recognition, 17 CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC 1 (2005); Dean E. Murphy, Bill Giving Native 
Hawaiians Sovereignty Is Too Much for Some, Too Little for Others, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, at A17; 
The Akaka Bill: What Would It Mean for Hawaii?, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, April 10, 2005, at B1-4. 
 
8 Judy Rohrer’s analysis of the Rice decision, which appeared too recently for me to benefit fully from it in 
writing this article, parallels my own in a number of ways.  She characterizes the Native Hawaiians’ double 
bind this way:  “Rice can be read as evidence of the white historical amnesia that ‘races’ a people, forgets it 
raced them, and then denies the material impact of that racialization when it becomes the ground on which 
that people begin to make claims.” Judy Rohrer, “Got Race?” The Production of Haole and the Distortion 
of Indigeneity in the Rice Decision, 18 CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC 1, 14 (2006). 
5accepted in Rice. Part IV will describe how the Court’s historical narrative interacts with 
the narrative of color-blindness to defeat Native Hawaiians’ claims to reparations and 
self-determination.  Part V will point to three strategies of resistance to the law as an 
instrument of colonial power:  reclaiming the native voice, critical analysis of “the law is 
colorblind,” and pursuit of Native Hawaiians’ self-determination through the mechanisms 
of international law. 
 
I. Hawaii’s History: Domination and Resistance 
A.  Domination: From Indigenous Society to Statehood  
1. When does Hawaii’s “history” begin? 
 
To narrate the history of the Hawaiian Islands is immediately to take sides in a 
political debate.  The first point of contention is when the Islands’ history begins.  Most 
Western histories skip the more than 1000 years of known human settlement in the 
Hawaiian Islands and begin their narrative with the “discovery” of Hawaii by Captain 
James Cook in 1778.  Gavin Daws, whose Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian 
Islands is the most popular and most-often cited modern treatment, reveals its Western 
bias in the first sentence of the Prologue:  “The existence of the Hawaiian Islands became 
known to Europeans late in the eighteenth century, at the end of the great age of 
exploration in the Pacific.”9 To Daws, and to almost all his fellow historians, Hawaiian 
history began—as Daws writes in the first sentence of Chapter 1 of Shoal of Time—when 
“at dawn on January 18, 1778, a high island, deep blue in the early light, appeared to the 
 
9 GAVIN DAWS, SHOAL OF TIME: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, at xi (1974). 
 
6northeast, and shortly afterward another to the north.”10 The observers of these deep blue 
islands were, of course, the crews of Cook’s sailing ships Resolution and Discovery.
If in fact it were possible to identify the first pair of eyes to view these islands 
emerging out of the Pacific mists, they would have belonged to an ocean voyager from 
the Marquesas Islands or thereabouts, who arrived in Hawaiian waters around 300 or 500 
A.D.  To accept this moment as the beginning of Hawaiian history, however, as well as 
the subsequent millennium of cultural and social development of an indigenous people, 
requires an enlargement of the historical record.  It requires recognition of the findings of 
archaeologists and anthropologists, as well as indigenous oral traditions transmitted in 
chants and genealogies such as the Hawaiian story of creation, the Kumalipo.11 Accepting 
the relevance and reliability of these sources is as much a political as a historiographical 
choice, because only by taking these sources seriously is it possible to construct a 
counternarrative to the Western account. 
2. Indigenous society  
 On the basis of the archaeological record and the traditional sources—the latter 
collated and transmitted in some cases by nineteenth-century Native Hawaiian writers 
such as David Malo12 and Samuel Kamakau,13 who learned English in schools run by 
 
10 Id. at 1. 
 
11 For extensive discussions and bibliographies of the archaeological and anthropological literature, and 
consideration of the traditional sources for pre-contact Hawaiian history, see PATRICK V. KIRCH, ON THE 
ROAD OF THE WINDS: AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS BEFORE EUROPEAN 
CONTACT (2000), and THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDERS (Donald Denoon et al. eds., 
1997). 
 
12 DAVID MALO, HAWAIIAN ANTIQUITIES (MO’OLELO HAWAII) (Nathaniel B. Emerson, trans., Bishop 
Museum Press ed. 1951) (1898). 
 
13 SAMUEL M. KAMAKAU, RULING CHIEFS OF HAWAII (Kamehameha Schools Press revised ed. 1992) 
(1961). 
7American missionaries—we can construct a picture of the indigenous society and culture 
of the Hawaiian Islands prior to European contact.  In brief, society was organized in 
clans or lineages under the authority of the Ali’i Nui, or “ruling chiefs.”  The Hawaiians 
regarded the Ali’i as mediators between the gods and ordinary people, responsible for 
ensuring the people’s prosperity by enforcing various taboos and carrying out rituals that 
demonstrated respect for the gods.14 
The organizing principle for the society was Malama ‘Aina—love, or reverence, 
for the land.  The land itself was divided for purposes of settlement, cultivation, and 
governance into districts, or ahupua’a. Private ownership was unknown.  Rather, the 
Ali’i, whose power and legitimacy derived primarily from their ability to embody 
Malama ‘Aina in themselves and to inspire it in their people, oversaw the interdependent 
relationships through which the necessities of life were exchanged among the people.  As 
historian LilikalQ Kame’eleihiwa put it:  
The ahupua’a were usually wedge-shaped sections of land that 
followed natural geographical boundaries, such as ridge lines and 
rivers, and ran from mountain to sea.  A valley bounded by ridges 
on two or three sides, and by the sea on the fourth, would be a 
natural ahupua’a. The word ahupua’a means “pig altar” and was 
named for the stone altars with pig head carvings that marked the 
boundaries of each ahupua’a. Ideally, an ahupua’a would include 
within its borders all the materials required for sustenance—
timber, thatching, and rope from the mountains, various crops from 
the uplands, kalo [taro] from the lowlands, and fish from the sea.  
All members of the society shared access to these life-giving 
necessities.15 
14 Malo, supra note 12, and  Kamakau, supra note 13. For a modern synthesis of the traditional sources, 
amplified by extensive original scholarship, see LILIKALRKAME’ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LANDS AND FOREIGN 
DESIRES: PEHEA LR E PONO AI? (1992), which provides background for this and the following paragraph. 
 
15 Kame’eleihiwa, supra note 13, at 27. 
 
8The pre-contact population of the Hawaiian Islands is also a politically contested 
historical “fact.”  Most Western histories place it between 300,000 and 400,000, a 
relatively conservative figure that minimizes the lethality of Western disease and land 
acquisition on the native population.  Other sources place the pre-contact population 
closer to one million.16 When Cook arrived in 1778 he encountered a political structure in 
which the Ali’i owed their allegiance to one or another of several moi (kings) who held 
ultimate authority on the various islands.  The strongest of these kings proved to be 
Kamehameha I, who successfully subdued the islands of Maui, Lana’i, Moloka’i and 
O’ahu, and by 1810 united the Hawaiian Islands under his rule by gaining the allegiance 
of Kaua’i.17 
3. Destruction of the native population  
 Between Cook’s arrival and 1820, the native population shrank to half its pre-
contact size; by 1866 only 57,000 Native Hawaiians were alive.18 Disease, famine, and 
war were the chief causes of the decline.  An ever-increasing flow of Western 
missionaries, merchants, and sailors putting in for supplies during whaling voyages 
aggravated the devastation.  Their disregard of indigenous land use, worship, and social 
organization profoundly disrupted the local culture. 
As in so many aspects of Hawaiian history, the massive die-off of the native 
population has inspired conflicting interpretations that reflect dominant ideological 
 
16 For a review of the evidence for the lower and higher estimates and the  ideological motivations behind 
them, see DAVID STANNARD, BEFORE THE HORROR: THE POPULATION OF HAWAII ON THE EVE OF WESTERN 
CONTACT (1989), and David Stannard, Disease and Infertility: A New Look at the Demographic Collapse 
of Native Populations in the Wake of Western Contact, 24 J. AM. STUD. 325 (1990). 
 
17 Kamakau, supra note 12; see also 1 RALPH KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM (1938). 
 
18 Stannard, Disease and Infertility, supra note 16; see also McCain Senate Report, supra note 7, at 8. 
 
9commitments.  For example, David Malo, the missionary-educated Hawaiian historian, 
appears to have internalized the values and perspectives of his teachers when he explains 
the effects of disease by referring to the natives’ licentiousness and promiscuity, and the 
internecine wars of the Ali’i. “God is angry,” wrote Malo in 1839, “and he is punishing 
his people.”19 Thirty years later, Samuel Kamakau took a different view, but English-
language readers would have missed the following passage from Kamakau’s history 
because the translator omitted it when rendering the Hawaiian original into English.  
Trying to account for the mass death of his people, Kamakau wrote (in Hawaiian): 
The reason for this misfortune and the decimation of the Hawaiian 
lahui [people, or nation], it is understood, is that the haole [whites]  
are people who kill other peoples; and their desire for glory and 
riches, those are the companions of the devastating diseases.20 
Among the most significant factors speeding the destruction of the population and 
the transfer of power into Western hands was the program of land tenure instigated under 
intense Western pressure by King Kamehameha in 1842.  Their lives and livelihoods in 
the ahupua’a having been disrupted by the waves of white settlers, Hawaiians had been 
migrating into Honolulu where they had little economic opportunity.21 By this time 
whites had gained dominant influence in the King’s Privy Council, largely because they 
controlled an increasing share of the economic activity on which the monarchy had come 
to depend. They convinced the King that private ownership of land would provide a 
 
19 Malo, supra note 11, quoted in NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE 
TO AMERICAN COLONIALISM  25 (2004). 
 
20 Kamakau, supra note 12, quoted in Silva, supra note 18, at 26. 
 
21 2 MICHAEL K. DUDLEY & KEONI K. AGARD, A HAWAIIAN NATION—A CALL FOR HAWAIIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY  1-7 (1990). 
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solution to the problem of urban migration.22 Under the land transfer program (known as 
the Mahele), land that had hitherto been held in common under the authority of the King 
and the Ali’i would be divided into categories: one-third would be retained by the King; 
one-third would be distributed to the Ali’i, and the rest would be available for private 
purchase.23 
The King agreed, on the condition that non-Hawaiians would not be allowed to 
own the land.  The Privy Council reneged on this agreement in 1850, however, and 
economically savvy whites soon bought up almost all of the available land from natives 
who had no understanding of western concepts of property rights.  Forty years later the 
1890 census revealed that the Mahele, which had been pressed on the King as a way to 
benefit the native population, had created a society in which almost all the landowners 
were the whites, who owned 75% of the land that was in private hands.24 
Even the massively destructive effects of the Mahele on native health and wealth 
were subject to interpretations that palliated whatever sting they may have inflicted on a 
white conscience.  Looking out at the rapidly changing economy and power structure in 
the Islands in 1851, a missionary-turned-businessman wrote: 
It seems as if Providence is fighting against this nation internally. 
…Diseases are fast numbering the people with the dead, and many 
 
22 Daws, supra note 8, at 124-128. 
 
23 Id. 
24 Dudley & Agard, supra note 20, at 15.  Native Hawaiians’ unfamiliarity with Western concepts of 
private property and naiveté in dealing with crafty Western businessmen are probably the best explanations 
for the ease with which such vast land holdings passed into Western hands.  But another factor was 
undoubtedly the language barrier, as a result of which Hawaiians simply had no idea what they were 
agreeing to when they accepted the terms of real estate documents.  This combination of cultural and 
linguistic disadvantage is quite similar to the history of Mexican-American land transfers after the Treaty of 
Guadaloupe Hidalgo.  For a careful analysis of that context, see Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicana/Chicano 
Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a “Naked Knife,” 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39 (1998). 
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more are slow to take advantage of the times and privileges 
granted to them by the King and Government. …While the natives 
stand confounded and amazed at their privileges and doubting the 
truth of the changes on their behalf, the foreigners are creeping in 
among them, getting their largest and best lands, water privileges, 
building lots, etc. etc. 
 
The Lord seems to be allowing such things to take place that the 
Islands may gradually pass into other hands.  This is trying but we 
cannot help it.  It is what we have been contending against for 
years, but the Lord is showing us that His thoughts are not our 
thoughts, neither are his ways our ways. The will of the Lord be 
done.25 
For many whites, then, their domination of the native was a sign of God’s 
providence. 
4. The consolidation of white control  
In the half-century following the Mahele, Western merchants and landowners 
consolidated their control of Hawaii’s land and people primarily through their 
development of the sugar industry.  Vast sections of Hawaii were transformed into 
plantations.  By 1900, when the Native Hawaiian population had dwindled to 
approximately 40,000, plantation owners had imported some 400,000 Chinese, Japanese, 
Portuguese, and Filipino laborers to support their operations.26 The economics of sugar 
required favorable trading terms with the United States.  To secure them, the landowners 
and merchants began agitating for closer ties between the then independent Kingdom of 
Hawaii and the United States, with an increasingly influential faction advocating outright 
annexation.  In 1887 these forces pressed Hawaii’s King David Kalakaua to accept a new 
constitution (the “Bayonet Constitution”) that reduced the power of the King, and for the 
 
25 Dudley & Agard, supra note 20, at 16. 
 
26 Hawaii Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 5. 
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first time in Hawaii’s history extended the right to vote to non-Hawaiian males.27 Soon 
the whites dominated the Legislature, and a concerted push for annexation by the United 
States was under way, reaching its climax in 1893 during the reign of Queen 
Lili’uokalani.28 
The ensuing events are summarized in the 2005 Senate Report to accompany the 
Akaka Bill: 
On January 14, 1893, the Queen was prepared to 
promulgate a new constitution, restoring the sovereign’s control 
over the House of Nobles and limiting the franchise to Hawaiian 
subjects.  She was, however, forced to withdraw her proposed 
constitution. 
Despite the Queen’s apparent acquiescence, the majority of 
westerners recognized that the Hawaiian monarchy posed a 
continuing threat to the unimpeded pursuit of their interests.  They 
formed a Committee of Public Safety to overthrow the Kingdom. 
…A Honolulu publisher and member of the Committee, Lorrin 
Thurston, informed the United States of a plan to dethrone the 
Queen.  In response, the Secretary of the Navy informed Thurston 
that President Harrison authorized him to say that “if conditions in 
Hawaii compel you to act as you have indicated, and you come to 
Washington with an annexation proposition you will find an 
exceedingly sympathetic administration here.”  The American 
annexation group collaborated closely with the United States 
Minister in Hawaii, John Stevens. 
On January 16, 1893, at the order of Minister Stevens, 
American soldiers marched through Honolulu, to a building … 
located near both the government building and the palace.  The 
next day, local revolutionaries seized the government building and 
demanded that Queen Lili’uokalani abdicate.29 
The Queen issued a statement: 
 
27 For a detailed account of the “Bayonet Constitution” and its relationship to the preceding century of 
Western infiltration of the indigenous society, see JONATHAN KAY KAMAKAWIWO’OLE OSORIO,
DISMEMBERING LRHUI: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN NATION TO 1887 (2002). 
 
28 Hawaii Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 5-6. 
 
29 McCain Senate Report, supra note 7, at 11. 
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I Lili’uokalani, by the Grace of God and under the Constitution of 
the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against 
any and all acts done against myself and the Constitutional 
Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming 
to have established Provisional Government of and for this 
kingdom. 
 
That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America 
whose Minister Plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, 
has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and 
declared that he would support the Provisional Government. 
 
Now to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss 
of life, I do under this protest and impelled by said force yield my 
authority until such time as the Government of the United States 
shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its 
representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as 
the Constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.30 
The Queen was never reinstated.  On February 1, 1893, the U.S. Minister raised 
the American flag and proclaimed Hawaii a protectorate of the United States.31 President 
Grover Cleveland refused to recognize the actions of the Provisional Government, and 
even declared that the overthrow would never have happened but for the intervention of 
American troops.32 However, William McKinley succeeded Cleveland in office in 1896, 
and McKinley was an eager annexationist.  Events now moved swiftly.  By August, 1898, 
the “Republic of Hawaii” had ceded sovereignty and conveyed title to its public lands to 
the United States, and by 1900 Congress had established a Territorial Government.  
Statehood arrived in 1959.33 
 
30 Hawaii Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 6. 
 
31 Id. 
 
32 Silva, supra note 19, at 170-172. 
 
33 Hawaii Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 7. 
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B.  Resistance: From the Sovereignty Movement to Rice v. Cayetano 
1.  Hawaii under the Americans 
 The remnant Native Hawaiian population fared very poorly under the United 
States.  Yamamoto, Shirota, and Kim summarize the post annexation history of Hawaii 
this way: 
Americans in control banned the Hawaiian language and closed 
Hawaiian schools.  As with many Native American tribes, Western 
diseases and the separation of Hawaiians from their homelands 
hastened an economic, cultural, and spiritual decline.  So 
devastating was this decline that in 1920 Congress deemed Native 
Hawaiians a “dying race” and set aside 200,000 acres of 
“homelands” to resurrect Hawaiian life and culture.  But this 
program was so poorly (and sometimes corruptly) administered by 
the federal and later state governments that non-Hawaiians ended 
up occupying most of the lands, while 20,000 Hawaiians jammed 
the homelands’ waiting list.34 
The Hawaiian Advisory Committee of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, using 
1999 data from the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, concluded, “the socioeconomic statistics 
depicting Native Hawaiians are startling. … [I]n comparison to other residents of Hawaii, 
Native Hawaiians have disproportionately low levels of employment, homeownership, 
income security, and education.  Conversely, they have disproportionately high levels of 
substance and physical abuse, medical problems, impaired mental health, and 
homelessness.”35 
34 Eric Yamamoto et al, Indigenous People’s Rights in U.S. Courts, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL 
ANTHOLOGY 301 (Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, ed., 2002). See also HAWAIIAN ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A BROKEN TRUST: THE HAWAIIAN HOMELAND 
PROGRAM: SEVENTY YEARS OF FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS (1991). 
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2. Native resistance movements and their effects 
 
Beginning in the 1960s Native Hawaiians began to organize protests of their 
social and economic conditions.  Most of the early resistance focused on land.36 Civil 
disobedience, forced evictions, and other means of protest called public attention to the 
impact of tourist development and other land use decisions on Native Hawaiians’ well-
being.  Native Hawaiian political organizations pressed for solutions ranging from 
secession and independence to some form of nation-within-a nation status analogous to 
that of Native American Indian tribes.  The largest of these groups, Ka LQhui Hawaii, 
promulgated a Master Plan for Hawaiian Self-Government in 1995, and sent 
representatives to United Nations-sponsored proceedings on the rights of indigenous 
peoples.37 
The first official response to this era of protest took the form of an amendment to 
the state constitution, establishing an Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) to coordinate 
programs that would benefit Native Hawaiians.  The OHA, with a nine-member board of 
trustees who could be selected only by voters legally defined as “Hawaiians,” 
administered 20 percent of the earnings from the public lands ceded to the State of 
Hawaii in 1959.  In addition, Congress passed a number of laws providing special 
benefits to Native Hawaiians, many acknowledging a “unique political relationship 
between the United States and Native Hawaiians.”38 Finally, in 1993, Congress passed a 
Joint Resolution “to acknowledge the 100th anniversary of the January, 17, 1893 
 
36 Trask, supra note 4, at 66-69. 
 
37 Id. at 71-75. 
 
38 Hawaii Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 18-20 
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overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and to offer an apology to Native Hawaiians for 
[that] overthrow.”39 
3. Resistance stalls 
 From the vantage point of 2006, the Apology Resolution appears to be the high 
water mark of the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement.  White resistance to Native 
Hawaiian preferences for benefit programs culminated in 1996 when Harold Rice, a 
white resident of Hawaii, filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, 
alleging that his right to vote for OHA trustees had been denied in violation of the 14th 
and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, the Civil Rights 
Act, and provisions of the Hawaii State Constitution.40 In an opinion issued on February 
23, 2000, the United States Supreme Court agreed that the statute permitting only 
Hawaiians to vote for trustees of OHA (legally a state agency) created a race-based 
classification in violation of the 15th Amendment.41 
Rice emboldened opponents of Native Hawaiian preferences to press the attack 
against many programs, even as the beneficiaries tried to convince the judiciary that their 
claims were not race-based but, rather, a recognition of the “special political relationship” 
between the United States and the Hawaiian people as spelled out in the Apology 
Resolution.  The Rice Court refused to accept this argument.  Though the Court 
acknowledged that in its 1974 opinion in Morton v. Mancari42 it had exempted voting 
 
39 S. Joint Res. 19, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993) (hereinafter, Apology Resolution). 
 
40 Rice v. Cayetano, Civ. No. 96-00390-DAE (D. Haw. filed Apr. 25, 1996). 
 
41 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 
42 417 U.S. 534 (1974). 
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preferences for Native Americans from Constitutional challenge, the Rice majority 
argued, 
If Hawaii's restriction were to be sustained under Mancari we 
would be required to accept some beginning premises not yet 
established in our case law. Among other postulates, it would be 
necessary to conclude that Congress has determined that native 
Hawaiians have a status like that of Indians in organized tribes, and 
that it may, and has, delegated to the State a broad authority to 
preserve that status. These propositions would raise questions of 
considerable moment and difficulty. It is a matter of some dispute, 
for instance, whether Congress may treat the native Hawaiians as it 
does the Indian tribes. We can stay far off that difficult terrain, 
however.43 
The Court then concluded that even if Congress had the authority to treat Native 
Hawaiians as tribes, “the State's argument fails for a more basic reason. … Congress may 
not authorize a State to create a voting scheme of this sort.”44 
The Supreme Court declined to analogize the Native Hawaiians to the Indian 
Tribes for purposes of evaluating the Hawaiians-only voting requirement in the OHA 
elections.  Lower courts that have continued to follow the reasoning that the Supreme 
Court articulated in Rice.  In a decision from 2005, a three-judge panel of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited Rice in support of its decision to strike down the 
admission policies of the private Kamehameha School in Honolulu, which favored 
applicants with pure or part aboriginal blood.45 
43 528 U.S. at 518. 
 
44 Id.
45 Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d. 1025, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005).  The 
Kamahameha Schools and Bishop Estate have recently filed a petition with the Ninth Circuit for a 
rehearing en banc. One of the amicus briefs filed to support their petition sheds at least some light on the 
current state of race relations in multi-ethnic Hawaii at this time of Native Hawaiian assertiveness and 
white Hawaii’s counterattack.  Honolulu attorneys Eric Yamamoto and Susan Serrano filed the brief on 
behalf of the Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii-Honolulu Chapter, Centro Legal de la Raza, 
and the Equal Justice Society, “a national organization of scholars, advocates, and individuals advancing 
18
If the tide has indeed turned against the Native Hawaiians, it is in part because of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s views of “race.”  It is also because the Court has accepted a 
particular version of Hawaiian history, privileging a narrative that, at least since the early 
nineteenth century, has served to legitimate western colonial domination.  To 
demonstrate these propositions, it will be necessary to examine the Rice decision from 
two perspectives:  post-colonial theories of narrative, and the role of narrative in the law. 
 
II. Theoretical Perspectives 
A.  Narrative in Post-Colonial Theory 
 Edward Said observed the intimate connection between power and control over 
others and the power to control stories about others.  “The power to narrate,” Said wrote,  
“or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and 
imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them.”46 Albert 
Memmi’s analysis of the psychological and power relations between colonizers and the 
colonized deepens Said’s insight.47 
1. Albert Memmi: The colonizer 
Memmi, a Tunisian Jew, was born in 1920.  His writings reflect his experience of 
French colonial rule.  Originally written in 1957, The Colonizer and the Colonized is in 
 
innovative legal strategies and public policy for enduring social change.” Brief of Amici Curiae Japanese 
American Citizens League of Hawaii-Honolulu Chapter et al. at 1, Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice 
Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d. 1025 (No. 04-15044). They conclude with the statement, “Hawaii’s 
multiracial populace supports Kamahameha Schools because restorative justice for Hawaii’s indigenous 
peoples benefits all.” (Id., at 11) 
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part a phenomenological account of the consciousness that accompanies colonial 
domination.  Memmi characterizes the colonizer as essentially a usurper. 
A foreigner, having come to a land by the accidents of history, he 
has succeeded not merely in creating a place for himself but also in 
taking away that of the inhabitant, granting himself astounding 
privileges to the detriment of those rightfully entitled to them.  And 
this is not by virtue of local laws, which in a certain way legitimize 
this inequality by tradition, but by upsetting the established rules 
and substituting his own.  He thus appears doubly unjust.  He is a 
privileged being and an illegitimately privileged one; that is a 
usurper.48 
In this setting, narrative is an essential tool of colonization because through it the 
colonizer so frames his situation and the situation of the colonized as to transform 
privilege into entitlement. This requires two basic moves.  One is to portray the 
colonized as so backward and primitive that they deserve their subordinate position.  The 
other is to repress or disguise the colonizer’s brutality.  Narrative is central to both.  Of 
the first move Memmi writes, 
[A]ccepting the reality of being a colonizer means agreeing to be a 
nonlegitimate privileged person, that is, a usurper.  To be sure, a 
usurper claims his place and, if need be, will defend it by every 
means at his disposal.  This amounts to saying that at the very time 
of his triumph, he admits that what triumphs in him is an image 
which he condemns.  …In other words, to possess victory 
completely he needs to absolve himself of it and the conditions 
under which it was attained.  This explains his strenuous 
insistence, strange for a victor, on apparently futile matters.  He 
endeavors to falsify history, he rewrites laws, he would extinguish 
memories—anything to succeed in transforming his usurpation 
into legitimacy. …His disquiet and resulting thirst for justification 
require the usurper to extol himself to the skies and to drive the 
usurped below ground at the same time.  In effect, these two 
attempts are inseparable.49 
48 Id. at 9. 
 
49 Id. at 52-53. 
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 In a passage that recalls the contrasting visions of contemporary Hawaii with 
which this paper began, Memmi points out that it would actually be psychologically 
untenable for the colonizer to acknowledge the destruction and devastation that he has 
worked on the land he has taken over, and so, 
No matter what happens he justifies everything—the system and 
the officials in it.  He obstinately pretends to have seen nothing of 
the poverty and injustice which are right under his nose; he is 
interested only in creating a position for himself, in obtaining his 
share. …Why should [the immigrants] not congratulate themselves 
for having come to the colony?  Should they not be convinced of 
the excellence of the system which makes them what they are?  
Henceforth they will defend it aggressively; they will end up 
believing it to be right.  In other words, the immigrant has been 
transformed into a colonialist.50 
Reciprocally, the colonizer must portray the colonized as having deserved their fate.  A 
typical argument—one that requires a supporting narrative of pre-colonial history—runs:  
“Before colonization, weren’t the colonized already backward?  If they let themselves be 
colonized, it is precisely because they did not have the capacity to fight, either militarily 
or technically.”51 
To Memmi, the arguments that the colonizer marshals in order to legitimize his 
usurpation are ineluctably racist.  “Colonial racism,” Memmi argues, “is built from three 
ideological components: one, the gulf between the culture of the colonialist and the 
colonized; two, the exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonialist; 
three, the use of these supposed differences as standards of absolute fact.”52 By 
essentializing the subordinate position of the colonized—by embedding subordination 
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51 Id. at 24-25. 
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and degradation into the colonized’s very nature—the colonialist both reassures himself 
of the appropriateness of his position and inoculates his domination against historical 
challenge.   
Racism appears, then, not as an incidental detail, but as a 
consubstantial part of colonialism.  It is the highest expression of 
the colonial system, and one of the most significant features of the 
colonialist.  Not only does it establish a fundamental 
discrimination between colonizer and colonized, a sine qua non of
colonial life, but it also lays the foundation for the immutability of 
this life. …The servitude of the colonized seemed scandalous to 
the colonizer and forced him to explain it away under the pain of 
ending the scandal and threatening his own existence.  Thanks to a 
double reconstruction of the colonized and himself, he is able both 
to justify and reassure himself. …[S]ince servitude is part of the 
nature of the colonized, and domination part of his own, there will 
be no dénouement.  To the delight of rewarded virtue he adds the 
necessity of natural laws.  Colonization is eternal, and he can look 
to his future without worries of any kind.53 
2. Ngugi wa Thiong’o: The cultural bomb  
The Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o delves as deeply as Memmi into the 
consciousness and motivations of the colonialist, but his sensitivities as a novelist and 
playwright draw the power of narrative into high relief.  Ngugi began his career, as did 
most African intellectuals of the twentieth century, writing in the language of the colonial 
power—in Ngugi’s case, English.  From 1977, however, in recognition of the paradoxical 
dilemma of the post-colonial critic of colonialism who must express his resistance in the 
language of his oppressor, Ngugi abandoned English in his artistic work for his tribal 
languages of GXkYyY and Kiswahili.54 He continues to write criticism and political 
commentary in English.  This background supplies an autobiographical flavor to Ngugi’s 
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assertion that of all the weapons imperialism and colonialism have in their arsenal, the 
biggest is “the cultural bomb.” 
The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people’s belief in 
their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their 
heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities, and 
ultimately in themselves.  It makes them see their past as one 
wasteland of non-achievement and makes them want to distance 
themselves from that wasteland.  It makes them want to identify 
with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, 
with other people’s languages rather than their own.  It makes them 
identify with that which is decadent and reactionary, all those 
forces which would stop their own springs of life.  It even plants 
serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle.  Possibilities 
of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams.  The 
intended results are despair, despondency, and a collective death-
wish.  Amidst this wasteland which it has created, imperialism 
presents itself as the cure and demands that the dependant sing 
hymns of praise with the constant refrain: “Theft is holy.”55 
Ngugi’s comments resonate sharply with the banning of the Hawaiian language 
that was an integral part of the United States’ post-annexation governance of the 
Islands.56 By forcing Hawaiians to communicate in the language of their oppressors, 
Ngugi’s perspective suggests, the American authorities struck not only at a means of 
communication but also at a carrier of culture.57 “Language carries culture,” Ngugi 
explains, “and culture carries, particularly through orature and literature, the entire body 
of values by which we come to perceive ourselves and our place in the world.  How 
people perceive themselves affects how they look at their culture, at their politics and at 
the social production of wealth, at their entire relationship to nature and to other beings.  
Language is thus inseparable from ourselves as a community of human beings with a 
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specific form and character, a specific history, a specific relationship to the world.”58 
Thus, to Ngugi, “The domination of a people’s language by the languages of the 
colonising nations was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the 
colonized.”59 
Through language and narrative, the “cultural bomb” wreaks its destruction in two 
ways.  As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, losing the ability to express oneself 
publicly in one’s native language leads to profound self-alienation and disempowerment.  
Ngugi calls this “colonial alienation.” 
It starts with a deliberate disassociation of the language of 
conceptualisation, of thinking, of formal education, of mental 
development, from the language of daily interaction in the home 
and in the community.  It is like separating the mind from the body 
so that they are occupying two unrelated linguistic spheres in the 
same person.  On a larger social scale it is like producing a society 
of bodiless heads and headless bodies.60 
We might call this effect of the cultural bomb an internal effect; it works from 
within the colonized person, to confuse, distort, and ultimately to paralyze the 
colonized’s mental processes, undermining the colonized’s will to self-assertion.  The 
cultural bomb also works externally, however, through the racist images of the colonized 
that are propagated through popular narratives in the colonizer’s language.  Ngugi 
illustrates this with “the three Africas” that emerged in nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
Western European fiction and travel writing.  Each of these “Africas” fixed an image of 
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backwardness, primitiveness, and exploitability that, in Memmi’s terms, supplied 
legitimation and reassurance to the imperialist enterprise. 
 The first “Africa” is that of the hunter after profit, exemplified for Ngugi in 
Balzac’s Eugénie Grandet. To the hunter for profit, “it does not matter what, in terms of 
human beings, the cost is of the profit that enables him to live in palaces and to marry 
well.  …When he looks at Africa it is not to see the human faces of the masses whose 
poverty and degradation and oppression are the real conditions for his rising rate of 
profit.  No, what he is looking for are conditions of stability, and it does not matter if that 
stability is founded on the blood and flesh of millions.  It does not matter, if you like, if 
that stability is founded on the fact that the tongues of millions have been mutilated to 
make them unable to shout their discontent.”61 
The second “Africa” is that of the hunter for pleasure—the tourist’s Africa 
portrayed in the travelogues and glossy airline magazines.  This Africa is populated 
mainly by animals in lush landscapes.  Between the covers of books with titles such as 
Vanishing Africa or The Authentic African, the tourist finds that 
in the pictures that illustrate the books such Africans are nearly 
always naked and they are often photographed with animals to 
show [their] harmony with the animal landscape.  The hunter for 
pleasure is really the hunter for profit but on holiday.  He does not 
want to see or face up to the reality that is the African worker who 
creates his profit.  Hence the literary deathwish for the African 
engaged in the active struggle against nature and against human 
degradation.62 
The third “Africa” is the creation of European fiction writers.  To illustrate the 
mix of infantilization and dehumanization of Africans with which European novelists 
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paved the colonialist’s self-justifying path into the continent, Ngugi turns to Karen Blixen 
(Isak Dinesen), author of Out of Africa. Ngugi’s first example conveys a racism that is 
“catching because it is persuasively put forward as love.  But it is the love of a man for a 
horse or for a pet.”63 Ngugi quotes Blixen thus: 
When you have caught the rhythm of Africa, you find that it is the 
same in all her music.  What I learned from the game of the 
country was useful to me in my dealings with the native people.64 
Later in Blixen’s career, in her book Shadows in the Grass, she repeated her racist views 
even more emphatically:  
The dark nations of Africa, strikingly precocious as young 
children, seemed to come to a standstill in their mental growth at 
different ages.  The Kikuyu, Kawirondo and Wakambo, the people 
who worked for me on the farm, in early childhood were far ahead 
of white children of the same age, but they stopped quite suddenly 
at a stage corresponding to that of a European child of nine.  The 
Somali had got further and had all the mentality of boys of our 
own race at the age of 13 to 17.65 
B. Narrative in the Law 
 When law functions as an instrument of colonialism, the role of narrative is one 
thread in a broader tapestry.  P.G. McHugh describes the larger context as “the practice of 
lawfare against the tribes.”66 It has, in his view, four principal dimensions: law’s 
transformation of space into marketable real estate; the establishment of economic 
entitlements; the definition of aboriginal being; and the ritualization of encounters 
 
63 Id. 
64 Blixen, quoted by Ngugi, id. at 134. 
 
65 Id.
66 P.G. MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL SOCIETIES AND THE COMMON LAW 5 (2004). 
 
26
between aboriginals and the West, so that even in resistance the aboriginals confronted 
the colonialists on the latter’s terms.67 
Writing with particular emphasis on the impact of Western legal thought on the 
American Indian, Robert Williams, Jr., documents how Western colonizers deployed the 
“doctrine of discovery”—lands “discovered” by a colonial power became the property of 
the sovereign of that power—to justify the dispossession of the native inhabitants.68 
Williams echoes McHugh’s characterization of “lawfare” when he writes, 
Power, in its most brutal mass-mobilized form as will to empire, 
was of course far more determinate in the establishment of 
Western hegemony in the New World than were any laws or 
theoretical formulations on the legal rights and status of American 
Indians.  But the exercise of power as efficient colonizing force 
requires effective tools and instruments…[and]…law and legal 
discourse were the perfect instruments of empire for Spain, 
England, and the United States in their colonizing histories, 
performing legitimating, energizing, and constraining roles in the 
West’s assumption of power over the Indian’s America.69 
1. Paul Gewirtz: Law and storytelling   
To appreciate how colonialist narratives perform their work of legitimation, 
reassurance (of the colonizer), and repression (of the colonized) within the framework of 
the legal system, we may refer first to work on law, narrative, and rhetoric by Paul 
Gewirtz, Peter Brooks, and their colleagues at a symposium at Yale in 1995.70 They 
begin by describing trials as “the telling of stories.” This immediately suggests normative 
questions to Gewirtz, for example: “Are the right people getting their stories told, to a 
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sufficient degree and with adequate effectiveness?  Do the multiplicities of narratives at 
trial (and on appeal) undercut the idea of objectivity or the idea that there is such a thing 
as the truth?  Or does this narrative multiplicity suggest only that people are at times 
fallible or deceptive or at times so indifferent to truth that they may let people literally get 
away with murder?”71 
Delgado and Stefancic have described how standard courtroom procedures and 
rules of evidence make it almost impossible to tell one’s story in one’s own words, with 
the nuances, emotions, perspectives, and associations that make a story personal.72 
“Courts,” they write, “carve up your stories into little unfamiliar pieces, and then quiz 
you to see if you really believe in each of them.  They kill your narrative and transform it 
into something you do not recognize.  They force you to choose and defend a past that is 
unfamiliar to you—one that is not yours.”73 As McHugh points out, these “clinical 
procedures of the adversary system” are especially lethal to aboriginal land claims, 
because those claims typically rest on oral traditions that wither under the assault of the 
Western legal system’s bias in favor of written documentation.74 As one commentator on 
a 1979 case wrote of the Mashpee Indians’ failed attempt to obtain recognition as a tribe 
for purposes of legitimating claims to land in Massachusetts, “In the courtroom how 
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could one give value to an undocumented ‘tribal’ life largely invisible (or unheard) in the 
surviving record?”75 
If trials are contests between stories, then judicial opinions at the appellate level 
not only express the majority’s preference for the “winning” narrative, but, in their efforts 
to persuade, and rebut the preferences of the dissenters, the majority opinion is itself a 
narrative—plotted, structured, and equipped with rhetorical maneuvers and tropes.  This 
emerges with striking force when an appeals court overturns the court below, as did the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Rice v. Cayetano. In the terms of Brooks’s and Gewirtz’s 
perspective on narrative and the law, the reversal amounts to an appellate court’s 
retelling the story with a different outcome, using different 
narrative glue to bind events together.  And when the majority 
opinion is countered by dissent, two retellings are in competition, 
the one uneasily, though conclusively, victorious because it 
convinces at least one more of these professional listeners than did 
the other.  The law fascinates the literary critic in part because 
people go to jail, even to execution, because of the well-
formedness and force of the winning story.  Conviction in the legal 
sense results from the conviction created in those who judge the 
story.76 
2. Thomas Ross: Stories that subjugate  
Just as in the case of post-colonial narratives in the culture at large, such as those 
identified by Ngugi, legal narratives work both by what they include and in what they 
suppress.  Thomas Ross calls attention to the judicial opinions of nineteenth-century 
America that upheld American apartheid largely through their incorporation of 
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degrading, dehumanizing language about American blacks.77 Ross argues that these 
opinions served the same colonialist motivations of reassurance and legitimation of 
oppression that Memmi describes.  Writing of the subjugation of blacks in nineteenth-
century America, Ross observes, 
The basic tool for subjugation was law and the law’s necessary 
coherence came from narratives and assumptions that were in an 
inescapable sense chosen and not merely received.  They were 
chosen because they worked for the dominant race, even though 
they propped up a social structure that humiliated and subjugated 
innocent human beings.  Thus, narratives, like the law they built, 
were a reflection of the dominant moral values of nineteenth-
century America.78 
3. Robert Ferguson: Law’s untold stories 
By incorporating stories that justified subjugation, judicial opinions such as those 
in Dred Scott79 and Plessy v. Ferguson80 institutionalized the racism of the day.  But it is 
equally important to recognize how the legal stories that are not told serve—by their very 
absence from the record—to perpetuate structures of racial or economic domination.  In 
his analysis of “untold stories in the law,” Robert Ferguson asks, “In the proliferation and 
refinement of courtroom stories, what does it mean when an available and viable account 
is not raised in courtroom debate?  What, in effect, happens when a relevant story is 
actively repressed in a republic of laws?”81 
77 THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS 24-34 (1996). 
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 Using as his illustrative example the near total obliteration from the public record 
of slaves’ defenses to the charge of insurrection in early nineteenth-century Virginia, 
Ferguson argues that these defenses have not simply been “lost”—they have been 
actively supressed.  The dilemma for the white power structure, Ferguson asserts, lay in 
the contradiction of punishing (sometimes by execution) rebellious slaves who justified 
their actions in the same terms of freedom and equality that the white slaveholders had 
relied upon in their revolt against England.  Rather than confront the contradiction, the 
slaveholders wiped the record clean of the slaves’ defenses. Thus, writes Ferguson, “The 
surface narrative of a courtroom transcript is not unlike the consciousness of an 
individual; both offer the official record of what passes for explanation, and both know 
themselves to be under distinct pressure from other levels of explanation that need to be 
contained.”82 Thus do the institutions of the law contribute to a “structural amnesia” on 
the part of the dominant society, creating what in anthropologist Mary Douglas’s words 
are “shadowed places in which nothing can be seen and no questions asked.”83 
The problem for the Virginia planters was reconciling slavery with their ideology 
of equality.  Transposing the dynamic of structural amnesia and untold stories to the 
contemporary situation of the Native Hawaiians, we will see that the problem for the 
white power structure, and for the Rice majority, was reconciling their denial of 
Hawaiians’ self-determination with the very explicit language of Congress’s Apology 
Resolution.  In both contexts, Ferguson might suggest, the contradiction stimulates the 
oppressor to deploy rhetorical and narrative strategies that conceal the contradiction’s 
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attendant psychological discomfort.  In the case of the Hawaiians, one additional legal 
narrative was available for the purpose, a narrative that could sustain a regime of racial 
oppression without labeling it as such. This is the narrative of America’s constitutional 
color-blindness. 
4. Neil Gotanda: Racial subordination under a color-blind constitution  
 Justice Harlan’s declaration in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson that “our 
constitution is color-blind”84 is the starting point for Neil Gotanda’s extended analysis of 
the impact of Harlan’s formulation on the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent racial 
jurisprudence.85 Gotanda finds that the Court’s use of Harlan’s legacy in a set of cases 
from the 1980s 86 actually “maintains the social, economic, and political advantages that 
whites hold over other Americans.”87 Four different meanings of “race” in the language 
of the Court are central to Gotanda’s analysis.  He argues that in the Court’s usage, “race” 
can connote (a) status-race, (b) formal-race, (c) historical-race, or (d) culture-race.88 For 
present purposes, the significant distinction is between formal-race and historical-race. 
 When the Court uses “race” to connote formal-race, Gotanda finds that black and 
white are “neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely ‘skin color’ or country of 
ancestral origin.  [The terms are]…unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral 
culpability,… [and]… unconnected to social attributes such as culture, education, wealth, 
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or language.”89 By contrast, “historical-race embodies past and continuing racial 
subordination, and is the meaning of race that the Court contemplates when it applies 
‘strict scrutiny’ to racially disadvantaging government conduct.”90 Importantly for 
Gotanda, formal-race is so thoroughly disconnected from social realities—that is, from 
the historically and socially conditioned experience of racial oppression in the lives of 
people of color—that when it dominates the Court’s color-blind constitutional analysis 
the Court “often fails to recognize the connections between the race of an individual and 
the real social conditions underlying a litigation or other constitutional dispute.”91 The 
resulting judicial prescription for racial problems in America is for the government “to 
adopt a position of ‘never’ considering race.”92 
 To Gotanda, color-blind constitutionalism in the formal-race mode produces 
results that are as suspicious psychologically as they are legally perverse.  For the 
government (or an employer) to assert that it notices the race of an individual but does 
not consider it—as demanded by the principle of non-recognition—flies in the face of the 
lived experience of individuals.  It is a pretense, and Gotanda sees in it the urge toward 
suppression of an uncomfortable reality that we have previously encountered in the 
analyses of Memmi and Ferguson.  “Nonrecognition,” Gotanda writes, “fosters the 
systematic denial of racial subordination and the psychological repression of an 
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individual’s recognition of that subordination, thereby allowing that subordination to 
continue.”93 
 Analysis in the formal-race mode enables courts to tell a particular kind of story 
about racial prejudice in American society.  The story is that racial prejudice is a matter 
of individual attitudes, unrelated to larger social structures or relations.  Viewing racism 
as a trait of individuals, divorced from any societal or institutional dimensions, absolves 
courts from the responsibility to connect a racial minority’s subordination to structural 
factors such as substandard housing, education, employment, or income.  With 
institutional racism erased, the color-blind constitutionalist is free to interpret evidence of 
a group’s disadvantage as isolated phenomena outside of history, or else as the workings 
of “market forces.”94 In short, Gotanda concludes,  
color-blind constitutionalists live in an ideological world where 
racial subordination is ubiquitous yet disregarded—unless it takes 
the form of individual, intended, and irrational prejudice.  Perhaps 
formal-race analysis would be a useful tool for fighting racism, if it 
recognized that racism is complex and systematic.  However, as 
presently used, formal-race unconnectedness helps maintain white 
privilege by limiting discussion or consideration of racial 
subordination.95 
Gotanda’s principle of non-recognition, and his concept of formal-race, are two 
keys to the effectiveness of the narrative of color-blindness in enabling the Rice Court to 
maintain Native Hawaiians in a condition of subordination and disempowerment, not 
only in the face of the nation’s history of colonial oppression, but contrary to the manifest 
intent of the Apology Resolution.  The third and last key, from Gotanda’s perspective, is 
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the interaction of non-recognition and formal-race with the doctrine of strict scrutiny.  As 
illustrated in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson,96 formal-race enables the Court to apply 
the strict scrutiny standard to racial preferences designed to mitigate the social and 
historical effects of racial discrimination, as effectively as historical-race had supported 
the Court’s holding against racial discrimination in Brown v. Board of Education.97 
Gotanda finds in the Court’s reasoning in Croson traces of the formal-race analysis in 
Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent in a 1974 affirmative action case, DeFunis v. 
Odegaard.98 DeFunis had charged that the University of Washington Law School had 
accepted less qualified minority applicants and denied admission to him.  In dissent, 
Douglas rejected the consideration of race in the admissions process, arguing, 
A DeFunis who is white is entitled to no advantage because of that 
fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter what his race or 
color.  Whatever his race, he had a constitutional right to have his 
application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral 
manner.99 
We will encounter the identical reasoning in Rice v. Cayetano’s approach to 
voting rights.  There, as here, Gotanda’s analysis will suggest the legal perversity of 
applying, to a policy designed to mitigate the effects of centuries of governmentally 
sanctioned and racially-inspired dispossession and oppression, the same constitutional 
analysis that evolved to target government-sanctioned racial oppression itself. 
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 This discussion completes the historical and theoretical foundations for assessing 
the Supreme Court’s Rice decision.  Now let us consider the details of the racialized 
history that legitimated the colonial take-over of Hawaii, and how the Court, by 
privileging that history in its opinion and adopting a formal-race mode of constitutional 
analysis, has perpetuated Native Hawaiians’ colonialist subordination by the United 
States.  It will remain for the last section of the paper to outline three avenues for Native 
Hawaiian resistance to U.S. law as an instrument of colonial power. 
 
III.  Racialized History and the Colonial Take-Over of Hawaii 
Western accounts of Hawaii amply illustrate Memmi’s insight that colonialist 
history legitimates conquest by simultaneously devaluing the colonized and ennobling the 
colonizer.  A review by Jocelyn Linnekin for the Cambridge History of the Pacific 
Islanders shows how colonialist historians portray Europeans as actors, the Islanders as 
acted upon—natives are “less rational, less industrious, less capable, and less stable” than 
the Westerners.100 “Colonial historiography,” Linnekin notes, “tends to convey certain 
key messages about early encounters: that Islanders were naïve and readily responded to 
crude materialist appeals, that foreign introductions were the primary agents of change, 
and that first encounters with Europeans were the most important events in Island 
history.”101 We can observe these themes in the Western narrative of Hawaii—and the 
colonialist agendas underlying them—in five areas: (a) descriptions of the nature of 
indigenous society; (b) accounts of land reform; (c) characterization of the overthrow in 
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1893; (d) Hawaiians’ “consent” to annexation; and (e) the termination of Hawaii’s status 
as a non-self-governing entity as defined by the United Nations. 
A. Describing Indigenous Society: From Primitive Savagery to the Happy Hula 
Land 
 
Captain James Cook’s journal entry for January 19, 1778, recording his first face-
to-face meeting with Hawaiian Islanders, sets the tone of colonialist condescension: 
The next morning we stood in for the land and were met with 
several Canoes filled with people, some of them took courage and 
ventured on board.  I never saw Indians so much astonished at the 
[sic] entering a ship before, their eyes were continually flying from 
object to object, the wildness of their looks and actions fully 
express’d their surprise and astonishment at the several new 
o[b]jects before them and evinced that they had never been on 
board ship before  However the first man that came on board did 
not with all his surprise, forget his own interest, the first moveable 
thing that came his way was the lead and line, which he without 
asking questions took to put in his Canoe. …At 9 o’clock being 
pretty near the shore, I sent three armed boats…to look for a 
landing place and fresh water. …As the boats put off an Indian 
stole the Butcher[’s] cleaver, leaped over the board with it, got into 
his canoe and made for shore, the boats pursued him but to no 
effect.102 
American missionaries carried on in the same vein, emphasizing in their letters 
back home the laziness, lewdness, and childishness of the natives they had come to save.  
Daws quotes from these letters to portray the missionaries’ moralistic disdain for native 
women, for example, who showed little energy for productive labor, yet “when it came to 
frivolous diversion such as a hula they would practice energetically in the hot sun for 
days on end.”103 Far worse than “lewd dancing” and public nakedness in the 
missionaries’ eyes, however, were reports of polygamy, royal incest, abortion, and 
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infanticide.104 One of the leaders of an early missionary band, the Reverend Hiram 
Bingham, described his first sight of the natives on March 30, 1820: 
The appearance of destitution, degradation, and barbarism, among 
the chattering, and almost naked savages, whose heads and feet, 
and much of their sunburnt and swarthy skins, were bare, was 
appalling.  Some of our number, with gushing tears, turned away 
from the spectacle.  Others, with firmer nerve, continued their 
gaze, but were ready to exclaim, “Can these be human beings! 
…Can we throw ourselves upon these rude shores, and take up our 
abode, for life, among such a people, for the purpose of training 
them for heaven?”105 
The answer, of course, was yes.  Throw themselves on those shores they did, 
fortified for the ordeal by the conviction that they were doing God’s will and fulfilling 
the white man’s destiny at the same time.  Even sixty years later, when white settlers had 
subdued vast tracts of Hawaiian land for sugar plantations, and with the indigenous 
population declining precipitously from poverty, social dislocation, and disease, one 
planter explained to the readers of the local monthly newspaper, 
The word in the beginning seems to have been spoken to the white 
man, when he was commanded “to subdue the earth and have 
dominion over it.”  …He has stepped across the Pacific Ocean, 
leaving the imprint of his enterprising foot upon the various islands 
of the sea; he has taken possession of Australia and India, with 
their countless thousands; he has gone to Africa. …The coming of 
the white man to Africa means government, enterprise, agriculture, 
commerce, churches, schools, law and order.  It will be better for 
the colored man to have the white man rule.  It is better for the 
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colored man of India and Australia that the white man rules, and it 
is better here that the white man should rule.106 
An intermixture of cultural devaluation with colonialist designs on the Islands’ 
wealth emerges with breathtaking clarity in the correspondence of the United States 
Minister to Hawaii in the months leading up to the overthrow of the Queen.  In a letter 
dated November 19, 1892, Minister Stevens excoriated the Hawaiian monarchy as “an 
absurd anachronism.”107 With its feudal basis eroded by the new economics of the sugar 
industry, “the monarchy now is only an impediment to good government—an obstruction 
to the prosperity and progress of the islands.”108 A few months later, on February 1, 1893, 
the Queen was out of power, the American-led provisional government was consolidating 
its control, and Stevens exulted in a letter to the State Department, “The Hawaiian pear is 
now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it.”109 
The pear was plucked formally at statehood in 1959.  Since then, a demeaning 
cultural narrative has remained in place.  As with Ngugi’s “three Africas,”110 the 
colonialist cultural narrative for Hawaii undermines the legitimacy of serious indigenous 
resistance to western dominance.  A primary weapon of subordination in the 
contemporary narrative echoes the missionaries’ preoccupation with exoticized, 
eroticized Hawaiian women, now epitomized in the tourist industry’s construction of the 
hula girl.  “Hawaiian women,” notes Trask, “are marketed on posters from Paris to Tokyo 
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promising an unfettered ‘primitive’ sexuality.  Burdened with commodification of our 
culture and exploitation of our people, Hawaiians exist in an occupied country whose 
hostage people are forced to witness (and for many, participate in) our own collective 
humiliation as tourist artifacts for the First World.”111 
Another local critic connects the humiliating and primitivizing effects of 
tourism—which she calls the marketing of “kitsch”—directly to the colonialist goal of 
perpetuating subordination.  “By making Hawaiian-ness seem ridiculous [from aloha 
shirts to tiki bars to pineapple and ham pizza], kitsch functions to undermine sovereignty 
in a very fundamental way.  A culture without dignity cannot be conceived of as having 
sovereign rights, and the repeated marketing of kitsch Hawaiian-ness leads to non-
Hawaiians’ misunderstanding and degradation of Hawaiian culture and history.  
Bombarded by kitsch along with images of leisure and paradise, non-Hawaiians fail to 
take Hawaiian sovereignty seriously and Hawaiian activism remains invisible to the 
mainstream.”112 
Hall concludes with an observation that summons Memmi’s notion that through 
narrative the colonizer disguises and suppresses the evidence of his brutal rise to power.  
The frivolity and omnipresence of kitsch images of Hawaii cover 
over a history of massive death, colonial dispossession, and 
attempted cultural destruction.  And yet another factor that enables 
the kitschy transformations of Hawaiians and Hawaiian culture is 
that unlike other stigmatized groups in the United States, 
Hawaiians are not feared. …Instead, our friendliness has been a 
major selling point for the tourist industry for more than a century, 
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possibly because the death toll from colonization was so one-
sided.113 
B. Land Reform 
 
As noted above, the principal motivation for Westerners to agitate for private 
ownership of land was economic.  The benefits of capitalist, industrial exploitation of the 
Islands—particularly through sugar—depended upon investors’ ability to consolidate 
large land holdings for the plantations.  White advisors to the Hawaiian King pressed 
their case most fervently in the 1840s, at a time when land fever was sweeping the 
American mainland in places such as the northern coast of California and the Oregon 
Territory.114 The Ali’i Nui (chiefs), however, had their doubts.  The interdependence of 
the native ahupua’a (communal land) system had proved itself capable of providing for 
people’s needs, and the Western concepts of private ownership and sovereign, exclusive 
control over individual plots were strange and forbidding. 
 As Kame’eleihiwa relates in her native-centered history of the Mahele, the white 
business interests worked to overcome Ali’i opposition along two paths.  One strategy 
was to cut deals with the Ali’i that assured them of large holdings of their own under the 
new system.  This strategy succeeded in part for reasons of economic self-interest on the 
part of the Hawaiians, but also, as Kame’eleihiwa explains, through a fortuitous (for the 
whites) linguistic ambiguity.  The word Mahele as used by the Westerners carried the 
primary meaning of “divide,” and referred to the division of communal land rights into 
privately held individual portions.  In Hawaiian, however, Mahele has an additional 
connotation—“to share,” as one would do with one’s food or wealth.  Kame’elehiwa 
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thinks it likely that Westerners took advantage of the Ali’i’s expectation that they would 
continue to be able to provide unrestricted access to food for their people, because of the 
Ali’i’s interpretation of the Mahele as a sharing of sovereignty over land rather than 
alienating it to foreign interests who would exercise exclusive control.115 
The second approach to convincing the Ali’i to cooperate in the Mahele depended 
on the missionaries and was frankly racist.  Calvinist missionaries who had learned the 
Hawaiian language and whom the Ali’i regarded as the new kahuna (respected leaders), 
carried great influence with the native chiefs.  In 1846 the missionaries embarked on an 
intense campaign to persuade the Ali’i that private ownership of land was in the best 
interests of the common people.  The message they preached, orally and through 
dissemination of publications throughout the Islands, was that the native population was 
declining substantially and something drastic needed to be done.  Disease and economic 
dislocation following the arrival of whites had, indeed, taken a drastic toll on the 
population.  The missionaries argued, however, that the cause of the decline lay in the 
characteristics of the natives themselves.  The common people, they explained, were 
“licentious, indolent, improvident and ignorant.”116 The oppressive structure of 
centralized land control aggravated these tendencies, the missionaries argued, and the 
best way “to render them industrious, moral and happy” would be to allow them to hold 
their land in fee.117 Kame’elehiwa concludes, 
Once [the native common people] held their taro patches and house 
lots in fee, the theory ran, [they] would have the incentive to 
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become industrious, hard working, and Christian, because they 
alone would receive the benefit of their labor.  Once [they] became 
industrious, they would give up their bad habits, save money, and 
become wealthy—and the alarming decline in Hawaiian 
population would be halted.  This latter point was perhaps the one 
that most influenced the Mo’i [kings] and Ali’i Nui.118 
C. The Overthrow of 1893 
U.S. business interests “plucked the Hawaiian pear” in January, 1893 in a coup 
d’état supported by U.S. armed forces.  Prior to the overthrow, the Western planters and 
businessmen had intimidated Queen Lili’uokalani’s predecessor, King Kalakaua, into 
accepting “the Bayonet Constitution”—a set of governmental “reforms” that effectively 
placed Hawaii under the Westerners’ control.  The new Constitution also extended voting 
rights for the first time to American and European males, regardless of citizenship, and 
instituted new property requirements that effectively excluded Native Hawaiians from 
voting for a newly formed House of Nobles.119 When the Queen attempted to restore the 
previous constitution of Hawaii, the Americans had the pretext they were looking for to 
form a Committee of Safety and, with the backing of the U.S. armed forces coming from 
ships in Honolulu Harbor, force the Queen’s abdication.   
Western historians have characterized the overthrow as a triumph of democratic 
values over native despotism.  On one hand they have emphasized that the Queen’s 
efforts to revert to the prior constitution would have nullified the vote for American and 
European males.  The Committee of Safety thus appears bent on preserving the franchise 
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for non-Hawaiians, in the spirit of democracy.120 On the other hand, Western historians 
paint an unflattering portrait of the Queen.  As Silva points out, these historians rely on 
English-language newspapers and the memoirs of the planters in their descriptions of the 
Queen as lazy, autocratic, and ineffectual.121 One author, Lawrence Fuchs, characterizes 
the overthrow as a “revolution,”122 and the major chronicler of these events, William 
Adam Russ, begins his account by observing, “Lili’uokalani was not a good Queen.  That 
is certain.”123 Furthermore, Russ 
accepts without question [an American diplomat’s] report that the 
Queen, if restored, would have had [sugar baron Sanford] Dole and 
the others beheaded. (Queen Lili’uokalani strenuously objected on 
numerous occasions that she had said no such thing.)   He also 
concludes that the coup of 1893 was justified because “there can 
be no doubt that Royal Government under Kalakaua and 
Lili’uokalani was inefficient corrupt, and undependable.”124 
D. Hawaiians’ “Consent” to Annexation 
 In 1897, 21,269 Hawaiians signed an anti-annexation petition that they presented 
to the American government in Washington.  Even residents of the leper colony on 
Molokai added their signatures.125 The petition is one dramatic piece of evidence of 
steadfast local opposition to the Americans’ plan to take formal dominion over the 
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Islands.  Similar evidence abounds in the archives of the local press, in broadsides and 
placards, and even in popular song.126 And yet, as Noenoe K. Silva argues, native 
resistance to the occupation is practically invisible in the dominant Western histories of 
this period.  The major reasons for this invisibility are related: first, colonialist historians, 
as suggested by Ngugi and Memmi, are determined to erase native resistance so as to 
reassure the colonizer that he was welcomed as a savior or hero; and, second, almost all 
 
126 One song that was composed at this time, and which remains popular in Hawaii to the present day, is 
sometimes referred to as “the stone-eating song,” because of one poignant verse in which Native Hawaiians 
proclaim their preference to be nourished by eating the stones of their own land rather than by the profits of 
land sales to Westerners.  The song is entitled Kaulana NG Pua (“Famous Are the Flowers”) and an English 
translation reads: 
 
Famous are the children of 
 Hawaii 
Ever loyal to the land 
When the evil-hearted messenger 
 comes 
With his greedy document of 
 extortion. 
 
Hawaii, land of Keawe answers. 
Pi‘ilani’s bays help. 
Mano’s Kauai lends support 
And so do the sands of 
 Kakuhihewa. 
 
No one will fix a signature 
To the paper of the enemy 
With its sin of annexation 
And sale of native civil rights. 
 
We do not value 
The government’s sums of  
 money. 
We are satisfied with the stones, 
Astonishing food of the land. 
 
We back Lili‘u-lani 
Who has won the rights of the 
 land. 
(She will be crowned again) 
Tell the story 
Of the people who love their 
 land. 
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the evidence of resistance is in the Hawaiian language, which most Western historians 
could not (and still cannot) read.127 
The suppression of the Hawaiian language and its replacement with English was 
the official policy of the Republic of Hawaii beginning in1896.  Whereas there had been 
77 Hawaiian-language schools in the Islands, only one remained after the 1896 law.128 It 
would not be legal to teach Hawaiian in the public schools of Hawaii again until 1986.129 
The dislocation, disempowerment, and humiliation of native language 
suppression—articulated by Ngugi and Memmi—did not appear to trouble the 
Westerners who maintained the policy for almost a century.  This excerpt from the Board 
of Education’s report to the Legislature in 1896 clearly conveys the colonialist attitude:  
Schools taught in the Hawaiian language have virtually ceased to 
exist and will probably never appear again in a Government report.  
Hawaiian parents without exception prefer that their children 
should be educated in the English language.  The gradual 
extinction of a Polynesian dialect may be regretted for sentimental 
reasons, but it is certainly for the interest of the Hawaiians 
themselves.130 
That the Board of Education so readily concluded that the extinction of the Hawaiian 
language was a benefit to native students stands as a tribute to the malign efficacy of the 
colonialist discourses that prevailed at this time. 
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E. The End of U.N. Status as a Non-Self-Governing Territory 
 A final example of the colonialist historian’s effort to render native Hawaiians as 
passive, grateful beneficiaries of Western domination is the United States’ assertion that 
by voting for Statehood in 1959 the Hawaiians renounced any claims or desires for 
independence and sovereignty.  From 1946 to 1959 Hawaii had been included on the 
United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories.131 Under international law, 
inhabitants of these territories have a right to self-determination, and the indigenous 
peoples in the territories enjoy internationally recognized rights to self-determination that 
are separate from the rights of colonized peoples.132 
The United Nations Fourth Committee adopted a resolution in 1953 that specified 
the nature of this right to self-determination, and the “factors which should be taken into 
account in deciding whether a Territory is or is not a Territory whose people have not yet 
attained a full measure of self-government.”133 According to Resolution 742, the 
population of a Non-Self-Governing Territory should be free to choose their status in 
relation to the governing State, through “informed and democratic processes.”134 
Inhabitants should be free to choose from a range of possibilities, “including 
independence,” although “it is recognized that self-government can also be achieved by 
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association with another State or group of States if this is done freely and on the basis of 
absolute equality.”135 
 The United States moved to de-list Hawaii as a Non-Self-Governing Territory 
after the 1959 Statehood vote, arguing that Hawaiians had fulfilled the U.N. mandate by 
voting yes to Statehood.136 And, indeed, a free choice to associate with the United States 
via Statehood is one of the alternatives included in Resolution 742.  The Hawaiian vote in 
1959 was deficient, however, in two significant ways that the United States version of 
events ignores.  First, the plebiscite in 1959 offered voters only two choices: the status 
quo (remaining as a Territory as had been the case since the Overthrow and Annexation), 
or Statehood.  Under the United Nations system, voters should have had the opportunity 
to choose other forms of relationship as well, “including independence.”137 
The second deficiency concerns the inclusion in the electorate of 1959 of all U.S. 
citizens who had resided in Hawaii for one year.  Outside of Hawaii, settler populations 
have been barred from participation in decolonization plebiscites. The result in Hawaii 
was, in Anaya’s words, that “plebiscite procedures allowed the majority settler 
population to overpower the voice of the Native Hawaiian people who were uniquely 
interested in a Hawaii reconstituted in accordance with self-determination values.”138 
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IV. The Incorporation of the Colonialist Narrative in Rice v. Cayetano 
The Supreme Court’s core holding in Rice v. Cayetano was that the State of 
Hawaii had used “Hawaiian ancestry” as “a proxy for race,”139 and therefore violated the 
15th Amendment to the Constitution when it limited the electorate for the OHA board of 
trustees to people of Hawaiian ancestry.140 The Court declined to hold that native 
Hawaiians have a special political relationship with the United States analogous to Native 
American Indians.141 Without such a special relationship, the Court subjected the race-
based voting requirement to strict scrutiny, rather than evaluating it, as the Ninth Circuit 
had previously done, for its rational relationship to the state’s effort to redress the Native 
Hawaiians’ loss of sovereignty to the United States.142 
The legal grounds for the Court’s substantive holding, its application of strict 
scrutiny to Native Hawaiian preferences in a number of policy areas, as well as the 
question of Native Hawaiians’ “special relationship,” have all been subject to voluminous 
commentary.143 My purpose in this paper is narrower.  It is to identify points in the Rice 
139 528 U.S. at 514. 
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against the Hawaiians’ qualification for a special status analogous to the Indian tribes is Stuart Minor 
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opinion where the Court incorporates the colonialist narrative of Hawaiian history, and to 
suggest how the Court’s perspective interacts with the narrative of constitutional 
colorblindness.   
Chris Iijima has carried out the most thorough critique of the historical aspects of 
the Rice opinion.144 Building on Iijima’s analysis I will identify several historical 
assumptions in the Rice majority’s opinion.  We can then see, in the light of the foregoing 
theoretical and historical discussions, how incorporation of these assumptions in the 
Court’s narrative enshrined an oppressive colonialist regime in the highest law of our 
land. 
A. The Court’s View of Hawaii’s History 
 The Rice majority prefaced its legal analysis with an overview of Hawaiian 
history.  In introducing its version of events, the Court took pains to portray itself as 
steering a neutral ground between other versions that might have political or ideological 
agendas.  “Historians and other scholars who write of Hawaii,” the Court observed, “will 
have a different purpose and more latitude than do we.  They may draw judgments either 
more laudatory or more harsh than the ones to which we refer.”145 The Court’s “limited 
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role,” it explained, “is to recount events as understood by the lawmakers, thus ensuring 
that we accord proper appreciation to their purposes in adopting the policies and laws at 
issue.”146 Under this bland, non-ideological cloak, the Court smuggled into its opinion a 
number of assumptions and biases that fit squarely within the colonialist narrative.  These 
include: (1) characterization of the white residents of Hawaii as “settlers” rather than 
“immigrants”; (2) condescending depictions of indigenous society compared to 
valorizing depictions of Christian missionaries and white business interests; and (3) 
minimizing almost to the point of denial the U.S. role in the illegal overthrow of the 
Queen, thereby evading the central findings of Congress in the Apology Resolution. 
1. White “settlers” 
 At two points in the opinion’s opening sections the Court betrays its ideologically 
tinged view of the status of white residents of Hawaii.  At the very beginning, the Court 
describes petitioner Harold Rice as “a citizen of Hawaii and thus himself a Hawaiian in a 
well-accepted sense of the term.”147 Of course, the sense in which Rice’s “Hawaiian-
ness” is “well-accepted” is the very essence of the dispute underlying the case.  The 
Court’s use of the phrase “well-accepted” signals its unwillingness to examine critically 
(or even to notice) how Western pretensions to “Hawaiian-ness” invalidate the central 
claim of the Native Hawaiians in the litigation, namely, that they are a separate, 
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indigenous people whose sovereignty white Westerners simply ignored when they took 
over the Hawaiians’ land and obliterated their culture.148 
The Court reinforces this bias at the conclusion of its historical review.  The Court 
notes the succession of immigrant groups that came to Hawaii to work in the sugar fields: 
“Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipinos [each of whom] has had its own history in 
Hawaii, its own struggles with societal and official discrimination, its own successes, and 
its own role in creating the present society of the islands.”149 This passage introduces two 
types of bias into the opinion.  First, as Iijima notes, the list of “immigrants” tellingly 
leaves out the whites!150 In the Court’s narrative, the white missionaries and businessmen 
who took absolute control of the indigenous society appear not as two more outsider 
groups, but as part of the earlier “settler” population on a par with the Hawaiians 
themselves.  Second, by elevating the struggles with discrimination of the Chinese, 
Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipinos, the Court manages to reduce the Native Hawaiians 
to the level of one interest group among others, deftly evading the fundamental question 
of the Hawaiians’ loss of sovereignty over their one and only homeland. 
2. The indigenous society and its white benefactors 
The biases in the Court’s depiction of pre-contact Hawaii are by turns subtle and 
glaring.  A subtle bias is the Court’s preference for the population estimates of pre-
contact Hawaii made by “some modern historians” that place it between 200,000 and 
 
148 Judy Rohrer remarks on the arrogance and presumption of Kennedy’s term “well-accepted,” and quotes 
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300,000.151 As noted above, not only are these figures at the low end even of most 
Western historians’ estimates, they are drastically below the estimates of 800,000 to one 
million suggested by archaeological and anthropological evidence.152 Even though the 
opinion later acknowledges that the population declined due to disease,153 the Court has 
softened the impact of that decline considerably by choosing the lower starting figure. 
Nothing is subtle about the Court’s condescending statement that “accounts of 
Hawaiian [pre-contact] life often remark upon the people’s capacity to find beauty and 
pleasure in their island existence, but life was not altogether idyllic.”154 Like a theater 
manager arranging the set for a morality play, the Court here brings on stage the 
childlike, primitive natives on the eve of their discovery by the forces of civilization.  
Then, as if discovering an aspect of Hawaiian history totally unlike anything that could 
be associated with Europe, the Court continues, “the islands were ruled by four different 
kings, and intra-Hawaiian wars could inflict great loss and suffering.”155 Lest readers 
miss the inherent barbarism and depravity of indigenous society, the Court adds that these 
kings or other chieftains “could order death or sacrifice of any subject.”156 
 The Christian missionaries, on the other hand, despite their historical role as the 
vanguard of an intrusive and finally dominant Western invasion force, appear to the 
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Court as seeking “to teach Hawaiians to abandon religious beliefs and customs that were 
contrary to Christian teachings and practices.”157 The white interests who took total 
control of the land and power structure of the Islands had, in the anodyne words of the 
Court, “increasing involvement…in the economic and political affairs of the 
Kingdom.”158 The principal arena for white conquest, of course, was land.  But the Court 
adopts a view of the land transfer that sees it, not as native dispossession and the 
disruption of a centuries-old system of interdependence of Ali’i and commoner, but as an 
extension of “rights” and the overthrow of “feudalism.”159 The Court further states, with 
no supporting evidence and in the face of the strong evidence to the contrary presented by 
Kame’elehiwa and other local historians, “Westerners were not the only ones with 
pressing concerns, however, for the disposition and ownership of land came to be an 
unsettled matter among the Hawaiians themselves.”160 
This is a familiar pattern of colonialist rationalization of conquest, as depicted by 
Memmi.  The colonizers portray the colonized as backward, passive, barbaric, and 
confused.  The colonizer is beneficent, civilized, and eager to extend “rights” where 
heretofore the natives have known only subservience to feudal powers exercised by kings 
and chieftains who (unlike the colonizers) wield arbitrary, death-dealing power. 
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3. The overthrow  
 It is also a mainstay of colonialist history to depict the ultimate act of conquest as 
a liberation.  Given the findings of President Cleveland in the aftermath of the overthrow 
of Queen Lili’uokalani,161 and the text of the Apology Resolution which acknowledges 
“the suppression of the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people” and “the 
participation of agents and citizens of the United States [in] the deprivation of the rights 
of Native Hawaiians to self-determination,”162 it would seem difficult for the Court to 
perform such interpretive prestidigitation. Yet, in two key sentences, the opinion attempts 
precisely that.  
 First, in an allusion to the events surrounding the Bayonet Constitution that barely 
acknowledges the intimidation of King Kalakaua, the Court reports that “Westerners 
forced the resignation of the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Hawaii and the adoption 
of a new Constitution, which, among other things, reduced the power of the monarchy 
and extended the right to vote to non-Hawaiians.”163 When the Court adverts to the 
overthrow of the Queen, it portrays it as a “response to an attempt by the then-Hawaiian 
monarch, Queen Lili’uokalani, to promulgate a new constitution restoring monarchical 
control over the House of Nobles and limiting the franchise to Hawaiian subjects.”164 
 In two swift strokes the Court re-writes history. Western business interests were 
the saviors of democracy, and the Queen—who in fact was acting to reassert the 
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legitimate and established order of native society after its usurpation by those Western 
interests a few years before—was a reactionary agent of tyranny.  Of course, neither 
President Cleveland nor the authors of the Apology Resolution interpreted events this 
way.  The Court, however, gives very short shrift to their perspectives.  While 
acknowledging that Cleveland was “unimpressed and indeed offended by the actions of 
the American Minister,” and that he “called for the restoration of the Hawaiian 
monarchy,” the Court weakly and vaguely notes that “the Queen could not resume her 
former place [and]...abdicated the throne a year later.”165 As for the findings of the 
Apology Resolution, the Court’s entire consideration of them appears in the following 
passage: 
 In 1993, a century after the intervention of the Committee of 
Safety, the Congress of the United States reviewed this history, and 
in particular the role of Minister Stevens.  Congress passed a Joint 
Resolution recounting the events in some detail and offering an 
apology to the Hawaiian people.166 
The opinion leaves opaque what the grounds for apology could possibly be.  
According to the Court’s construction of events, the Committee of Safety had preserved 
democracy and thwarted the tyrannical designs of the Queen.  Yet the Court is untroubled 
by the contradiction, a sign that the colonialist historian’s work of effacement and erasure 
of embarrassing or troubling facts has been very effective. 
B. Race 
 It is ironic that the Court’s highly racialized history is a prelude to a ruling that 
race has no permissible place in the State of Hawaii’s efforts to ameliorate the Native 
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Hawaiians’ dispossession.  Gotanda’s analysis of the multiple meanings of “race” throws 
light on the apparent contradiction, and on the double bind in which the Native 
Hawaiians find themselves when they turn to the legal system for redress.  In Gotanda’s 
terms, the Rice opinion inappropriately conflates and confuses formal-race and historical-
race.  When the Court applies the test of race-consciousness to the OHA voting 
requirement and finds it in violation of the 15th Amendment, it is construing race as 
formal-race.  This usage divorces the Hawaiians from their history of political and 
cultural dispossession at the hands of whites.  To do justice to this history, the Court 
would have to emphasize and acknowledge historical-race, which “embodies past and 
continuing racial subordination, and is the meaning of race that the Court contemplates 
when it applies ‘strict scrutiny’ to racially disadvantaging government conduct.”167 
The Court’s confusion, and its invidious effects on the Native Hawaiians, appear 
most clearly in two sentences from the Rice opinion.  To the Court, Hawaiian ancestry is 
a “proxy for race” because the drafters of the laws at issue in Rice sought to “emphasiz[e] 
the unique culture of the ancient Hawaiians…[and] preserve that commonality of people 
to the present day.”168 Yet only a few paragraphs later the Court inveighs against “race” 
because it “demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of 
by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”169 That the Court can move in such a 
short space from recognizing ancestry as worthy of respect, and as the source of the 
Hawaiian people’s identity and dignity, to condemning the identification of a people by 
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their ancestry as “demeaning,” signals profound conceptual confusion.  The Hawaiians 
pay a steep price for the Court’s confusion.  It is nothing less than that the Court attaches 
equal opprobrium to race-consciousness that oppresses and degrades a people, and to 
race-consciousness that attempts to right grievous historical wrongs. 
Summarizing these effects of Rice, and the racial confusion from which they flow, 
Mahealani Kamau’u offered this testimony at the 2000 Community Forum held by the 
Hawaii Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: 
In rendering its opinion, the High Court chose to apply the law as 
though entirely separate from the cultural, political, and economic 
context within which OHA’s voting process was created.  That 
context largely is the result of America’s misdeeds and the Hawaii 
electorate’s desire to make amends.  The Court appears to have 
been influenced by the increasingly dominant discourse of neo-
conservatism, which has emphasized the need for strictly color-
blind policies, calling for repeal of special treatment such as 
affirmative action and other race-remedial policies.  Under this 
doctrine, implicit assumptions regarding race include beliefs that 
any race consciousness is discrimination, that race is biological and 
thus a concept devoid of historical, cultural, or social content, and 
that a group is either racial or it is not.  And if it is racial, it cannot 
be characterized as political.  This approach allows America to 
ignore its historical oppression of Native Hawaiians when meting 
out justice in its courts of law.170 
Kamau’u’s comment shows how colonialist historical narrative and today’s 
narrative of colorblindness reinforce each other.  In the Rice opinion, the narratives work 
together to erase almost all historical traces of Western race-based usurpation and 
dispossession of Native Hawaiians.  The Court’s selective and biased historical reporting, 
despite the initial disavowal of any ideological purpose, perpetuates colonialist 
condescension toward native peoples; avoids the most uncomfortable facts concerning a 
near-genocidal population decline; glosses over the cunning manipulation of natives who 
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were unfamiliar with Western constructs of private property; and depicts the agents of the 
overthrow of the legitimate government of Hawaii as liberators and defenders of 
democratic rule.  In Ferguson’s terms, we cannot but suspect that the history that is 
absent from the Court’s narrative has not merely been omitted; it has been forcibly 
suppressed.171 
The formal-race analysis of the OHA’s voting requirement reinforces the Court’s 
“structural amnesia.”172 The Court’s reliance on formal-race denies history.  And, by 
emptying “race” of any historical content, the Court achieves two ends simultaneously.  
First, it conflates racial preferences that oppress with racial preferences that attempt to 
redress oppression.  Second, it reads out of its legal analysis the historical record that lay 
at the heart of the Apology Resolution.  The Rice opinion, and the rhetorical and 
analytical frameworks it embodies, call into question the prospects for Native Hawaiians 
to achieve justice within the U.S. justice system. 
 
V.  Conclusion: Resisting Law as an Instrument of Colonial Domination 
 McHugh’s analysis of the various forms of colonialist “lawfare against the 
tribes”173 laid a foundation for critical counterattack, and depicted Western legalism as “a 
site of intercultural struggle and contestation.”174 I have argued that the U.S. justice 
system is structurally and systematically biased against the claims of Native Hawaiians, 
and perhaps against the claims of other indigenous peoples as well.  The workings of 
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narrative in the law render the law itself an instrument of colonial domination.  At the 
same time, however, the analysis suggests three potential avenues of resistance:  (1) 
reclaiming and restoring the suppressed native voice; (2) continuing critical appraisal of 
the justice system’s use of “race”; and (3) recourse to international law. 
A. Reclaiming the Suppressed Native Voice 
 As we have seen, a colonialist historical narrative has played a major role in 
stifling the native voice at the U.S. Supreme Court.  That narrative skews the Court’s 
framing of the issues before it, and forecloses consideration of uncomfortable facts that 
would call into question not only the Court’s conceptual frame, but the justice of its 
holdings.  Accordingly, a remedy at this level will be to insist even more strenuously on 
the inclusion of the native historical voice in the Court’s construction of the historical 
record.  In the Hawaiian case, this will entail more reconstruction of the historical record 
of the sort undertaken by writers such as Iijima, Yamamoto, Trask, Kame’elehiwa, and 
Silva.   
This approach should also set the Hawaiian example beside the treatment at law, 
and in American culture generally, of the Native American Indian.  This is particularly 
apt in light of the (so far failed) attempt by Native Hawaiians to persuade the Supreme 
Court of the validity of the analogy between their “special relationship” with the 
government and that of the Indian tribes.  Robert Williams’ The American Indian in 
Western Legal Thought is both a resource and model for this approach.175 
175 Williams, supra note 2.  To broaden the canvas even further, and to situate the Hawaiians in the widest 
and richest context of indigenous peoples’ treatment by Western legal systems, see McHugh, supra note 
66. 
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 This task will entail the careful examination of a court’s historical narrative for 
traces of what Ngugi calls “the cultural bomb.”176 A court’s narrative is never neutral, 
notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s disclaimer at the beginning of his opinion in Rice v. 
Cayetano.177 “The power to narrate,” Said wrote, “or to block other narratives from 
forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one 
of the main connections between them.”178 The Rice opinion epitomized this connection. 
 As Delgado has pointed out, however, the power to block a narrative may be 
exerted at the initial trial level as well.179 In the Hawaiian case, resistance to this 
phenomenon might well require that the Native Hawaiian experience of cultural 
devaluation and stereotyping, as captured in Hall’s depiction of “kitsch,”180 and the 
everyday micro-aggressions that native Hawaiians encounter in contemporary Hawaii, be 
accorded greater weight as part of the presentation of grievances in court.  To gain a 
hearing for this experience at the trial level, the challenge is to make manifest and overt 
the harms caused by unconscious racism.  As Joel Kovel181 and Charles Lawrence182 have 
argued, unconscious racism perpetuates micro-aggression and subordination without the 
telltale markers of “intent” to discriminate (Lawrence) or the blatant forms of 
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“assaultive” racism (Kovel) that courts are more willing to acknowledge.  Trial attorneys 
litigating indigenous claims must be vigilant to assure that the accounts and stories that 
find their way into the trial record, and set the stage for appellate review, are those of the 
clients themselves, and not a distorted Westernized version.183 
B. Critical Appraisal of “Race” in U.S. Jurisprudence 
 Neil Gotanda points the way to heightened awareness of how courts’ use of 
formal-race freezes in place opportunities and distributions of resources that favor the 
white majority.  He makes the further point that narrative reinforces the oppressive 
effects of a court’s choice of analytic frameworks.  Thus, as a strategy of resistance, the 
actual flesh-and-blood stories that saturate historical-race are necessary complements to 
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husband stood accused of masterminding the “honor killing.”  Lead attorney for the defense was the 
famous American lawyer—and hero of the Scopes “monkey trial”—Clarence Darrow.  To the shame of 
Darrow’s overall reputation as a humanitarian protector of the downtrodden, Darrow mounted a vigorous 
defense that turned on a venerable trope: a white man’s understandable loss of control, to the point of 
insanity, at the very thought of his wife having been violated by “lust-sodden beasts” of color.  Id. at 363-
376.  Although the evidence of Massie’s guilt was overwhelming, Darrow’s narrative of white 
victimization moved the jury sufficiently to reduce his conviction to manslaughter.  Even this leniency, 
however, did not quiet the white public’s indignation, and in a final twist the Governor of Hawaii 
commuted the 10-year prison sentence to one hour. Massie went free. Id. at 388-390. 
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Gotanda’s theoretical analysis.  Ferguson’s use of the story of Gabriel’s rebellion,184 and 
Ross’s delving into the “rhetorical tapestry of race”185 exemplify a narrative-rich 
approach to exposing the oppressive effects of courts’ use of formal-race when assessing 
policies designed to counter the effects of historical racism. 
C. The International Law Arena 
 As Haunani-Kay Trask observes,  
Conflict over Native sovereignty is not unique to Hawaiians.  It is 
repeated throughout the Pacific Islands, indeed anywhere in the 
world where Native peoples suffer the yoke of oppression.  Like 
Tahitians, Kanaks, Maori, Australian Aborigines, Palestinians, the 
Kurdish peoples, Tibetans, the Maya, Quechua, and many other 
indigenous peoples, Native Hawaiians continue to struggle for self-
determination and self-preservation as a people.186 
More than a simple call for international solidarity, Trask’s observation points to 
the international human rights arena as a third avenue of resistance to the recalcitrance of 
the America legal system when it comes to breaking the bonds of the colonialist 
narrative.  Indeed, given how solidly the colonialist narrative is entrenched in American 
law, an advocate for Native Hawaiian sovereignty is justifiably pessimistic that domestic 
legal remedies are anywhere near at hand.  In this environment, an effort to reinscribe the 
Hawaiian Islands on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories is an 
appropriate strategy.187 In Trask’s words, 
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Civil rights must be subsumed under human rights; land claims, 
language transmission, and monetary compensation must be 
understood and argued in terms of our human rights as indigenous 
people rather than merely as citizens of the United States or the 
state of Hawaii. Given that Hawaiians were once self-governing 
under the Kingdom of Hawaii and given that the United States, 
through its diplomatic and military offices, played a central role in 
the overthrow of that Kingdom, our historical injury involves 
violation of international law.  Thus the context of the U.S. 
constitution is too small a framework in which to argue for 
sovereignty.  An international frame of reference, one that involves 
universal human rights, must be the context for discussion.188 
Two further arguments from contemporary history support an internationalist turn 
to the Native Hawaiians’ anti-colonialist struggle.  First, McHugh has documented a 
number of successes of similar movements around the globe during what he has termed 
the “jurisprudence of reconciliation” that marked the 1990s.189 The Draft United Nations 
Declaration of Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, agreed upon in July, 1993, 
by the members of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations190 is further 
evidence of a possibly more hospitable international climate for Native Hawaiian claims. 
 A second argument derives from Derrick Bell’s thesis of “interest convergence.”  
According to Bell, African American political and legal gains in the United States have 
occurred not because of whites’ recognition of the moral force of African Americans’ 
arguments for justice, but because an appearance of black progress serves the interests of 
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white elites.191 The prime example of this, Bell argues, is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education to jettison the separate but equal doctrine in the case of 
public schools.  The Court did not suddenly discover the injustice of segregation, Bell 
argues; rather, the United States could no longer afford the embarrassment of a flagrantly 
oppressed minority population in the midst of a world-wide competition with the Soviet 
Union for the allegiance of Third World countries during the Cold War.192 Richard 
Delgado has proposed that blacks and other minorities stand to make similar gains at a 
time when the United States is engaged in its self-proclaimed “War on Terrorism,” and is 
competing with Islamic fundamentalism for the hearts and minds of moderate forces 
across the Muslim world.193 An appeal in the international arena for justice for the 
dispossessed Native Hawaiians may gain traction as the U.S. strives to appear responsive 
to the claims of oppressed peoples everywhere, and perhaps even contrite about its 
colonial past. 
191 Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV.
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The international arena is not a panacea.  International law forums are hardly 
immune to colonialist modes of thought.  Furthermore, even if international judgments 
are favorable to an indigenous people, their effect will depend on state actors’ willingness 
to implement them.194 Nevertheless, a narrative perspective on the rights of indigenous 
peoples suggests a distinct advantage in placing the cause of the Native Hawaiians (or, 
indeed, of any single people) on the international stage, in solidarity with other peoples.  
On that stage, amplified by the parallel stories of other peoples who have experienced 
colonial domination, the native voice is louder, its timbre richer, its claim to attention 
more insistent. 
194 S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2nd ed. 2004). 
 
